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ROBERT	  PRESSEL	  ABSTRACT	  	   By	  selecting	  the	  pool	  of	  candidates	  that	  voters	  can	  choose	  from	  in	  the	  general	  election,	  party	  nominating	  contests	  play	  a	  fundamental	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  outcome	  of	  elections	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  government.	  	  However,	  past	  research	  has	  indicated	  that,	  due	  largely	  to	  the	  incumbency	  advantage,	  primary	  competition	  has	  declined	  dramatically	  since	  the	  institution’s	  origins.	  	  Strategic	  entry	  theory	  suggests	  that	  skilled	  candidates,	  often	  those	  holding	  prior	  political	  office,	  wait	  for	  the	  most	  opportune	  chance	  to	  run	  for	  higher	  office.	  	  To	  test	  this	  hypothesis,	  I	  collected	  data	  on	  all	  congressional	  districts	  and	  candidates	  from	  the	  2014	  midterm	  elections.	  	  Using	  candidate	  information	  gathered	  from	  the	  Federal	  Election	  Commission	  and	  other	  candidate	  databases,	  district	  level	  demographic	  and	  political	  data,	  and	  incumbent	  statistics,	  I	  developed	  a	  model	  using	  the	  individual	  and	  structural	  factors	  to	  predict	  when	  an	  experienced	  politician	  will	  challenge	  an	  incumbent	  within	  their	  own	  party.	  	  The	  data	  show	  that	  strong	  intraparty	  challenges	  are	  rare	  compared	  to	  cross-­‐party	  challenges,	  and	  that	  the	  most	  ideologically	  centrist	  incumbents,	  of	  either	  party,	  are	  the	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  “primaried”	  by	  an	  experienced	  and	  ambitious	  challenger.	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INTRODUCTION	  	   In	  the	  June	  2014	  Virginia	  Republican	  Party	  primary	  election,	  incumbent	  Congressman	  and	  House	  Majority	  Leader	  Eric	  Cantor	  was	  soundly	  defeated	  by	  political	  novice	  and	  Tea	  Party	  challenger	  David	  Brat,	  in	  what	  has	  been	  described	  as	  “one	  of	  the	  greatest	  political	  upsets	  of	  modern	  times”1.	  	  Despite	  a	  substantial	  lead	  in	  the	  polls,	  enormous	  fundraising	  and	  name	  recognition	  advantages,	  and	  the	  power	  of	  his	  office,	  Cantor	  lost	  his	  renomination	  battle	  to	  an	  inexperienced	  and	  little-­‐known	  candidate.	  	  Cantor’s	  defeat,	  however	  unexpected,	  was	  not	  unique	  for	  this	  era	  in	  American	  political	  history.	  	  Since	  the	  2010	  midterm	  elections,	  the	  conventional	  wisdom	  holds	  that	  many	  strong	  incumbent	  members	  of	  Congress,	  particularly	  moderate	  Republicans,	  have	  been	  defeated	  by	  more	  ideologically	  extremist	  challengers	  from	  within	  their	  own	  party.	  	  This	  trend	  of	  intra-­‐party	  competition	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Congressional	  elections,	  the	  ongoing	  2016	  Republican	  nomination,	  as	  well	  as	  disputes	  within	  Congress	  itself.	  	  Though	  the	  national	  media	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  high-­‐profile	  cases	  –	  such	  as	  Cantor	  –	  of	  incumbent	  defeat,	  how	  prevalent	  is	  this	  trend	  in	  the	  modern	  electoral	  system?	  	  In	  2010	  itself,	  only	  four	  incumbents,	  two	  Democrats	  and	  two	  Republicans,	  lost	  renomination,	  and	  in	  2012	  thirteen,	  though	  many	  of	  these	  were	  largely	  due	  to	  redistricting.	  	  In	  studying	  the	  Congressional	  primary	  process,	  this	  paper	  seeks	  to	  answer	  two	  questions:	  under	  what	  circumstances	  are	  incumbents	  “primaried”	  and	  face	  intra-­‐party	  challenges,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Barabak,	  Mark.	  "The	  Earthquake	  That	  Toppled	  Eric	  Cantor:	  How	  Did	  It	  Happen?"	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  June	  11,	  2014.	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particularly	  from	  strong	  opponents,	  and	  what	  individual	  factors	  determine	  challenger	  success?	  	  	  	   Any	  meaningful	  understanding	  of	  the	  electoral	  process	  requires	  study	  of	  all	  of	  its	  stages,	  from	  candidate	  entry	  to	  the	  general	  election.	  	  While	  most	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  elections	  and	  voting	  revolves	  around	  the	  final	  decision	  made	  by	  voters	  in	  November,	  those	  decisions	  themselves	  are	  heavily	  shaped	  by	  what	  comes	  before	  them:	  voter	  choice	  in	  the	  general	  election	  is	  shaped	  by	  ballot	  access	  laws,	  candidate	  and	  campaign	  resources,	  and,	  perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  party	  nominations	  in	  the	  preceding	  primary	  election.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  general	  weakness	  of	  third	  party	  and	  independent	  candidates	  for	  public	  positions,	  the	  nomination	  of	  one	  of	  the	  two	  major	  parties	  is	  all	  but	  necessary	  for	  a	  candidate	  who	  wishes	  to	  enter	  elected	  office	  at	  any	  level.	  	  Primary	  election	  victory	  and	  nomination	  not	  only	  grants	  the	  prospective	  office-­‐holder	  ballot	  access	  under	  the	  party	  label	  –	  a	  major	  boon	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  –	  but	  gives	  the	  candidate	  party	  fundraising	  and	  campaign	  structures,	  elite	  backing,	  and	  other	  perks	  of	  working	  within	  the	  two	  party	  system.	  	  In	  order	  to	  truly	  understand	  American	  elections,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  study	  the	  party	  nominating	  system.	  	   The	  primary	  contest	  itself	  however	  is	  not	  the	  first	  step	  in	  the	  candidate	  selection	  process.	  	  First,	  before	  any	  votes	  are	  cast	  or	  campaigning	  is	  done,	  potential	  candidates	  must	  make	  a	  decision	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  run	  in	  any	  given	  election.	  	  This	  further	  structures	  the	  choices	  available	  to	  the	  electorate,	  as	  an	  election	  can	  only	  have	  a	  meaningful	  choice	  should	  more	  than	  one	  candidate	  be	  on	  the	  ballot.	  	  A	  contest	  with	  only	  one	  candidate	  –	  in	  the	  primary	  or	  general	  election	  –	  is	  not	  truly	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competitive,	  and	  provides	  no	  opportunity	  for	  the	  electorate’s	  voice	  to	  be	  heard.	  	  Studying	  the	  individual	  level	  decision	  whether	  to	  run	  for	  public	  office	  is	  key	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  electoral	  process,	  and	  must	  be	  undertaken	  to	  construct	  a	  complete	  picture	  of	  the	  process	  of	  nomination	  and	  election.	  	  In	  particular,	  under	  Jacobson’s	  (1980)	  theory	  of	  strategic	  candidate	  entry,	  we	  must	  give	  additional	  attention	  to	  the	  candidacy	  decisions	  of	  experienced	  “strong”	  candidates,	  those	  who	  have	  held	  prior	  political	  office,	  and	  have	  the	  connections,	  abilities,	  and	  strategic	  knowledge	  necessary	  to	  determine	  the	  best	  moment	  to	  seek	  advancement,	  keeping	  in	  mind	  the	  challenges	  of	  running	  for	  the	  party	  nomination	  as	  well	  as	  general	  victory.	  	  This	  paper	  will	  discuss	  further	  the	  importance	  of	  strategic	  decision-­‐making.	  	   	  	  Within	  the	  frameworks	  of	  strategic	  candidate	  entry	  and	  primary	  selection	  models,	  there	  are	  two	  increasingly	  important	  aspects	  of	  American	  electoral	  history	  that	  make	  the	  study	  of	  primary	  challenges	  more	  crucial	  than	  ever.	  	  As	  repeated	  studies	  have	  shown	  (Cox	  and	  Katz	  1996,	  Ansolabehere	  and	  Snyder	  2002,	  Abramowitz,	  Alexander,	  and	  Gunning	  2006),	  the	  incumbency	  advantage	  has	  increased	  substantially	  over	  time.	  	  Whether	  in	  the	  general	  election	  or	  in	  party	  nominating	  contests	  incumbents	  are	  now	  ever	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  reelected,	  particularly	  since	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  direct	  primary	  system	  on	  the	  Congressional	  level	  near	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  (Ferejohn	  1977;	  Ansolabehere,	  Hansen,	  et	  al.	  2010,	  Carson,	  Engstrom,	  and	  Roberts	  2007).	  	  The	  growth	  in	  the	  incumbency	  advantage	  is	  demonstrated	  not	  only	  through	  increases	  in	  reelection	  rates,	  but	  can	  be	  measured	  indirectly	  in	  the	  number	  of	  challengers	  an	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incumbent	  faces	  in	  subsequent	  races.	  	  As	  I	  will	  expand	  upon	  further	  in	  this	  paper,	  we	  can	  expect	  incumbents	  in	  safe	  seats	  to	  face	  fewer	  challengers,	  particularly	  experienced	  opponents	  looking	  for	  a	  strategic	  entry.	  	  While	  most	  studies	  of	  anti-­‐incumbent	  challengers	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  general	  election,	  I	  seek	  to	  understand	  when	  a	  strong	  copartisan	  challenger	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  run.	  	   In	  addition	  to	  a	  greater	  incumbency	  advantage,	  a	  rising	  number	  of	  Congressional	  districts	  are	  effectively	  “single-­‐party”	  (Mayhew	  1974;	  Abramowitz,	  Alexander,	  and	  Gunning	  2006).	  	  Within	  these	  districts,	  inter-­‐party	  competition	  is	  minimal,	  and	  incumbents	  of	  the	  dominant	  party	  can	  confidently	  expect	  reelection	  without	  needing	  to	  run	  a	  robust	  campaign,	  and	  in	  many	  elections	  will	  not	  even	  face	  a	  major	  party	  opponent.	  Democrat	  Mike	  Capuano,	  representing	  the	  Massachusetts	  7th	  district,	  is	  one	  example.	  	  He	  has	  not	  faced	  a	  Republican	  opponent	  since	  his	  initial	  run	  for	  Congress	  in	  1998,	  and	  often	  receives	  a	  near	  unanimous	  reelection2.	  	  Within	  these	  districts,	  the	  only	  realistic	  mechanism	  for	  political	  change,	  as	  well	  as	  electoral	  competition,	  lies	  within	  the	  primary	  process.	  	  However,	  despite	  the	  importance	  of	  intra-­‐party	  challenges	  under	  these	  circumstances,	  the	  literature	  is	  largely	  lacking	  on	  the	  means	  by	  which	  incumbents	  are	  challenged,	  and	  defeated,	  from	  within	  their	  own	  party.	  	  This	  is	  a	  question	  I	  seek	  to	  answer	  using	  a	  unique	  survey	  of	  the	  2014	  midterm	  elections.	  	  	  	  	   Although	  the	  major	  focus	  of	  this	  paper	  will	  be	  primary	  challenges	  to	  copartisan	  incumbents,	  I	  will	  also	  study	  the	  primary	  contests	  of	  cross-­‐partisans	  who	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  "Lexington:	  How	  to	  Win	  99.6%	  of	  the	  Vote."	  The	  Economist,	  October	  25,	  2014.	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seek	  to	  oust	  incumbents,	  as	  well	  as	  key	  factors	  in	  open	  primaries	  with	  no	  incumbent	  on	  the	  ballot.	  	  While	  extensive	  literature	  exists	  on	  cross	  party	  challenges	  for	  Congress,	  much	  of	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  general	  election,	  centering	  on	  the	  candidates	  who	  ultimately	  receive	  the	  nomination	  as	  the	  field	  of	  study.	  	  While	  this	  is	  of	  clear	  import	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  electoral	  selection	  process,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  primary	  remains	  key	  even	  when	  challenging	  incumbents	  of	  the	  other	  party:	  how	  do	  institutional	  and	  individual	  factors	  affect	  these	  elections	  differently	  than	  we	  would	  see	  challenging	  a	  copartisan	  incumbent?	  	  Open	  primaries,	  those	  where	  an	  incumbent	  is	  not	  on	  the	  ballot	  in	  either	  party’s	  primary,	  remain	  another	  key	  aspect	  of	  study.	  	  Consistent	  with	  strategic	  entry	  theory,	  we	  should	  expect	  to	  see	  the	  greatest	  level	  of	  competition	  in	  these	  races	  (Gaddie	  and	  Bullock	  2000),	  as	  an	  open	  seat	  represents	  the	  greatest	  chance	  for	  an	  aspiring	  candidate	  to	  achieve	  higher	  office.	  	  With	  that	  framework	  in	  mind,	  a	  drastically	  different	  primary	  dynamic	  can	  be	  anticipated,	  as	  viable	  candidates	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  partisan	  aisle	  may	  strive	  for	  a	  contested	  seat.	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THEORY	  	   The	  current	  state	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  primary	  challenges	  is	  fairly	  limited	  and	  while	  attempts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  construct	  a	  picture	  of	  intra-­‐party	  competition,	  much	  of	  the	  existing	  research	  focuses	  on	  either	  non-­‐Congressional	  primaries,	  particularly	  the	  presidential	  races,	  or	  on	  lower	  level	  offices	  with	  significantly	  different	  dynamics	  and	  levels	  voter	  interest.	  	  While	  study	  of	  the	  presidential	  primary	  process	  is	  certainly	  important,	  that	  area	  of	  research	  represents	  only	  one	  uniquely	  high-­‐profile	  and	  salient	  contest,	  while	  ignoring	  the	  theoretically	  hundreds	  of	  congressional	  primaries	  every	  two	  years,	  not	  to	  mention	  thousands	  of	  state	  legislative	  contests,	  all	  of	  which	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  direction	  and	  state	  of	  government	  at	  all	  levels.	  	  While	  many	  studies	  of	  the	  presidential	  race	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  fundraising	  (Brown,	  Powell,	  and	  Wilcox	  1995),	  endorsements	  (Bartels	  1996),	  prior	  office	  (Peabody,	  Ornstein,	  and	  Rohde	  1976;	  Burden	  2002),	  character	  (Glass	  1985),	  and	  countless	  other	  aspects,	  these	  contests	  remain	  distinct	  from	  congressional	  races	  due	  to	  increased	  media	  attention	  (Ansolabehere,	  Behr,	  and	  Iyengar	  1991),	  their	  individualistically	  driven	  nature	  and	  shifting	  institutions.	  	  To	  a	  much	  larger	  extent,	  with	  some	  small	  exceptions,	  such	  as	  the	  growth	  of	  non-­‐partisan	  “blanket”	  or	  “jungle”	  primaries	  (Kanthak	  and	  Morton	  2001),	  the	  congressional	  system	  has	  remained	  relatively	  consistent	  since	  its	  inception,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  presidential	  nominating	  contest,	  and	  changes	  through	  the	  McGovern-­‐Fraser	  Reforms,	  frontloading,	  and	  many	  other	  electoral	  shifts.	  	  Due	  to	  a	  much	  larger	  sample	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size,	  we	  can	  construct	  a	  far	  more	  complete	  picture	  of	  congressional	  rather	  than	  presidential	  primaries.	  	   In	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  studies	  of	  legislative	  nominating	  contests,	  Turner	  (1953)	  studies	  the	  role	  that	  primary	  elections	  can	  play	  in	  promoting	  competition	  in	  districts	  dominated	  by	  one	  party	  during	  the	  primary	  election,	  hypothesizing	  that	  although	  incumbent	  turnover	  is	  unlikely	  in	  the	  general	  election,	  the	  primary	  can	  provide	  a	  means	  for	  ambitious	  challengers	  to	  seek	  higher	  office.	  	  By	  examining	  the	  number	  of	  candidates	  in	  all	  primary	  races	  in	  “safe”	  districts	  (60%	  of	  the	  general	  election	  vote),	  he	  finds	  that	  only	  about	  half	  of	  “safe”	  seats	  have	  contested	  primary	  elections,	  with	  of	  course	  a	  major	  incumbency	  advantage	  even	  in	  contested	  races.	  	  While	  later	  studies	  of	  primaries	  have	  accounted	  for	  district	  partisanship,	  none	  have	  sought	  to	  reconsider	  this	  basic	  question.	  Herrnson	  and	  Gimpel	  (1995)	  attempt	  to	  look	  at	  the	  effect	  that	  district	  conditions	  can	  have	  on	  party	  primary	  divisiveness.	  	  They	  first	  introduce	  a	  new	  metric	  to	  determine	  the	  level	  of	  competition	  in	  a	  multi-­‐candidate	  race.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  typical	  general	  elections,	  in	  which	  only	  the	  two	  major	  party	  candidates	  often	  receive	  significant	  vote	  totals,	  many	  candidates	  can,	  receive	  significant	  shares	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  a	  party	  primary.	  	  	  They	  measure	  divisiveness	  as	  1-­‐Σpi2,	  wherein	  a	  race	  where	  one	  candidate	  receives	  100%	  of	  the	  vote	  will	  score	  0,	  and	  a	  more	  contested	  race	  will	  receive	  a	  higher	  value.	  	  Using	  data	  from	  the	  1984	  election,	  they	  analyze	  the	  affect	  of	  five	  variables	  on	  this	  measure	  of	  competition:	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  makeup,	  diversity	  of	  a	  district,	  level	  of	  urbanization,	  party	  organization,	  and	  state-­‐level	  political	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opportunity	  structures,	  with	  controls	  for	  party,	  region,	  and	  prior	  election	  results.	  	  While	  they	  do	  not	  focus	  much	  on	  candidate	  level	  factors	  or	  consider	  strategic	  entry,	  their	  research	  provides	  important	  insight	  into	  key	  factors	  of	  primary	  competition.	  	  They	  find	  that	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  Democrats	  tend	  to	  have	  more	  competitive	  primary	  races,	  which	  they	  attribute	  to	  differences	  among	  the	  parties’	  pools	  of	  state	  legislators.	  	  Moreover,	  they	  note	  that	  diversity	  seems	  to	  increase	  competition	  as	  well,	  while	  urbanization	  has	  little	  to	  no	  effect.	  	  Finally,	  region	  seems	  to	  matter,	  with	  the	  northeast	  the	  most	  competitive	  and	  the	  south	  the	  least.	  	  Their	  findings	  on	  diversity	  however	  seem	  to	  be	  challenged	  by	  Bond	  (1983),	  who	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  little	  relationship	  between	  diversity	  and	  competition,	  using	  a	  subjective	  measure	  of	  competition	  deriving	  from	  analysis	  rather	  than	  results	  of	  a	  race.	  A	  similar	  study	  by	  Schantz	  (1980)	  examines	  similar	  institutional	  structures	  affecting	  primary	  competition,	  though	  with	  some	  distinctly	  different	  results.	  	  Unlike	  Herrnson	  and	  Gimpel,	  Schantz	  examines	  primaries	  not	  through	  their	  level	  of	  divisiveness	  should	  they	  be	  contested,	  but	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  contest	  exists.	  	  He	  creates	  four	  models,	  uncontested	  and	  contested	  primaries,	  for	  each	  party,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  structural	  district	  effects	  under	  each	  condition.	  	  Using	  all	  House	  primaries	  from	  1956-­‐1974,	  he	  finds	  that	  while	  Democrats	  tend	  to	  have	  more	  competitive	  races,	  Republicans	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  yearly	  events,	  such	  as	  presidential	  races.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  Turner’s	  findings,	  Schantz	  does	  detect	  an	  effect	  on	  primary	  competition	  from	  the	  likelihood	  of	  winning	  the	  general	  election:	  	  open	  seat	  primaries	  are	  significantly	  more	  competitive	  in	  safe	  seats,	  while	  incumbents	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largely	  tend	  to	  avoid	  contests,	  regardless	  of	  general	  election	  margins.	  	  This	  latter	  finding	  is	  consistent	  with	  later	  research	  (Jewell	  and	  Breaux	  1991;	  Ansolabehere,	  Hansen,	  et	  al.	  2007)	  the	  incumbency	  advantage	  remains	  equally	  strong,	  if	  not	  stronger,	  in	  primary	  elections,	  where	  not	  only	  do	  incumbents	  tend	  to	  perform	  well	  in	  the	  vote	  count,	  but	  generate	  a	  “scare-­‐off”	  effect,	  where	  candidates	  face	  fewer	  challengers	  in	  attempting	  renomination	  than	  in	  their	  initial	  run.	  	  Schantz	  also	  finds	  that	  amongst	  Democrats	  urbanization	  tends	  to	  increase	  competition,	  and	  that	  unsurprisingly,	  recent	  redistricting	  draws	  challengers.	  	   A	  more	  contemporary	  study	  of	  congressional	  primaries	  focuses	  on	  individual,	  rather	  than	  institutional,	  traits	  and	  their	  affect	  on	  the	  level	  of	  competition.	  	  Pyeatt	  (2013)	  studies	  the	  role	  the	  incumbent	  plays	  in	  encouraging	  or	  discouraging	  strong	  challengers,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  few	  district	  factors.	  	  Using	  two	  models,	  one	  including	  all	  challengers	  from	  1980-­‐2008,	  and	  the	  other	  excluding	  non-­‐competitive	  ones	  (any	  race	  where	  the	  incumbent	  receives	  more	  than	  75%	  of	  the	  primary	  vote),	  Pyeatt	  examines	  incumbent	  ideology	  and	  influence	  in	  Congress.	  	  He	  finds	  that	  while	  an	  incumbent’s	  ideological	  extremism	  relative	  to	  the	  party	  plays	  little	  role	  in	  deterring	  all	  challengers,	  a	  more	  ideologically	  extreme	  candidate	  can	  successfully	  deter	  strong	  challengers	  who	  could	  threaten	  his	  or	  her	  renomination.	  	  Additionally,	  he	  finds	  that	  while	  committee	  membership	  and	  House	  leadership	  do	  little	  do	  reduce	  challenges,	  high	  margins	  of	  victory	  in	  the	  preceding	  election	  as	  well	  as	  institutional	  party	  support	  both	  protect	  incumbents	  from	  strong	  challengers.	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Hirano	  and	  Snyder	  (2014)	  find	  that	  while	  competition	  has	  long	  been	  greater	  for	  seats	  with	  no	  incumbent	  and	  in	  strongly	  partisan	  districts,	  levels	  have	  dropped	  in	  recent	  times.	  	  Unsurprisingly,	  while	  incumbents	  have	  always	  faced	  low	  levels	  of	  competition,	  it	  has	  declined	  precipitously	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  In	  non-­‐safe	  districts,	  levels	  of	  competition	  tend	  to	  be	  lower	  regardless	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  incumbent,	  though	  they	  do	  find	  that	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  low-­‐quality	  incumbent,	  primaries	  provide	  a	  strong	  mechanism	  to	  replace	  him	  or	  her	  with	  a	  quality	  challenger.	  	  Moreover,	  their	  finding	  that	  open-­‐primaries	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  competitive	  in	  safe	  districts	  than	  marginal	  districts	  is	  consistent	  with	  previous	  research,	  which	  suggests	  that	  a	  divisive	  primary	  process	  hurts	  party	  chances	  in	  the	  general	  election	  (Bernstein	  1977;	  Born	  1981).	  	  Given	  this	  framework,	  we	  can	  expect	  that	  strategic	  challengers,	  those	  who’s	  entry	  would	  likely	  lead	  to	  a	  divisive	  primary	  (Squire,	  1992),	  but	  who	  we	  can	  also	  expect	  to	  have	  stronger	  attachments	  to	  their	  party	  (Leyden	  and	  Borrelli	  1990)	  will	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  challenge	  an	  incumbent	  in	  a	  marginal	  seat	  than	  a	  safe	  one,	  as	  they	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  jeopardize	  their	  party’s	  chances	  in	  the	  general	  election.	  These	  findings	  regarding	  congressional	  primaries	  have	  also	  been	  upheld	  in	  studies	  of	  state	  legislative	  nominating	  contests.	  	  While	  on	  a	  much	  lower	  political	  level	  than	  House	  races,	  and	  exhibiting	  significantly	  decreased	  public	  attention	  (Jacobson	  1978),	  we	  can	  generalize	  findings	  from	  state	  legislative	  primaries	  to	  those	  of	  Congress,	  particularly	  when	  considering	  the	  candidate	  entry	  portion	  of	  the	  selection	  model.	  	  Though	  the	  decision	  to	  run	  for	  Congress	  requires	  more	  strategic	  thinking,	  increased	  resources,	  and	  stronger	  campaigns	  than	  the	  state	  house,	  the	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dynamics	  of	  entering	  the	  race,	  and	  of	  voter	  attention,	  remain	  similar,	  albeit	  on	  a	  smaller	  scale.	  	  Two	  studies	  of	  these	  primaries	  suggest	  that	  the	  same	  factors	  that	  increase	  congressional	  competition	  affect	  state	  races.	  	  Grau	  (1981)	  adopts	  a	  binary	  model	  of	  competition	  similar	  to	  early	  studies	  of	  House	  races:	  asking	  if	  there	  is	  more	  than	  one	  candidate	  on	  the	  ballot.	  	  In	  his	  sample	  of	  primaries	  in	  15	  states	  from	  1972-­‐1978,	  he	  finds	  that	  like	  congressional	  contests,	  in	  House	  races	  Democrats	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  competitive,	  and	  that	  urbanization	  and	  partisan	  safety	  increase	  competition,	  while	  incumbency	  suppresses	  candidate	  entry.	  	  Using	  Herrnson	  and	  Gimpel’s	  (1995)	  measure	  of	  competition,	  Hogan	  (2003),	  performs	  a	  similar	  study,	  with	  a	  sample	  of	  25	  states	  from	  1994-­‐1996,	  but	  includes	  additional	  variables	  to	  measure	  for	  state	  primary	  rules	  –	  open	  vs.	  closed,	  single-­‐ballot	  vs.	  runoff	  –	  as	  well	  as	  legislative	  professionalism.	  	  He	  finds	  that	  while	  there	  is	  little	  difference	  in	  competition	  between	  open	  and	  closed	  races,	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  runoff	  vote	  seems	  to	  increase	  competition,	  perhaps	  due	  to	  the	  potential	  for	  strategic	  benefits	  for	  a	  candidate	  who	  loses.	  	  Additionally,	  legislative	  professionalism	  strongly	  increases	  the	  level	  of	  competition,	  as	  states	  with	  higher	  legislator	  salaries,	  larger	  staffs,	  and	  other	  measures	  of	  professionalism	  tend	  to	  have	  more	  competitive	  races.	  Since	  this	  paper	  will	  in	  part	  focus	  on	  the	  individual	  candidate	  entry	  aspect	  of	  the	  primary	  process,	  it	  is	  imperative	  to	  spend	  some	  time	  on	  strategic	  candidate	  theory.	  	  Jacobson	  (1980)	  proposes	  that	  much	  of	  an	  elections	  outcome	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  political	  strengths	  of	  the	  challenger,	  rather	  than	  being	  solely	  focused	  on	  the	  incumbent.	  	  Stronger	  challengers,	  which	  he	  defines	  as	  those	  with	  prior	  experience	  in	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elected	  office,	  tend	  to	  raise	  more	  money	  (Maestas	  and	  Rugely	  2008),	  have	  higher	  name	  recognition	  and	  approval	  (Squire	  1992),	  and	  consequently	  tend	  to	  perform	  better	  in	  the	  polls	  than	  their	  non-­‐experienced	  counterparts,	  both	  when	  contesting	  open	  seats	  and	  challenging	  incumbents.	  	  Further	  development	  of	  strategic	  entry	  and	  candidate	  quality	  theories	  suggest	  that	  not	  only	  do	  experienced	  candidates	  tend	  to	  perform	  better	  in	  electoral	  contests,	  but	  that,	  when	  choosing	  to	  run	  for	  higher	  office,	  they	  wait	  for	  the	  best	  strategic	  election	  year	  to	  do	  so	  (Jacobson	  1989;	  Lublin	  1994;	  Maestas,	  Fulton,	  et	  al.	  2006).	  	  	  The	  strategic	  decision	  to	  run	  derives	  from	  a	  number	  of	  factors.	  	  First,	  and	  perhaps	  foremost,	  is	  the	  presence	  or	  lack	  of	  an	  incumbent.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  significant	  advantage	  that	  incumbents	  face	  in	  all	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  aid	  renomination	  or	  reelection	  –	  fundraising,	  institutional	  support,	  name	  recognition,	  experience,	  etc.	  –	  an	  open	  seat	  will	  almost	  always	  be	  the	  most	  strategically	  viable	  time	  for	  an	  ambitious	  politician	  to	  seek	  higher	  office	  (Epstein	  and	  Zemsky	  1995;	  Bond,	  Fleischer,	  and	  Talbert	  1997,	  Ansolabehere,	  Hansen,	  et	  al.	  2007)	  for	  challengers	  in	  either	  primary	  or	  general	  elections.	  	  Additionally,	  strategic	  candidates	  tend	  to	  wait	  for	  favorable	  national	  conditions,	  such	  as	  presidential	  approval	  (Jacobson	  1989),	  economic	  indicators	  (Jacobson	  1989;	  Lublin	  1994;	  Ashworth	  and	  de	  Mesquita	  2008),	  and	  anti-­‐incumbency	  sentiment	  (Thorson	  and	  Stambough	  1995).	  	  These	  same	  economic	  and	  partisan	  indicators	  also	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  promoting	  competition	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  perhaps	  to	  a	  greater	  extent	  than	  national	  trends	  (Bond,	  Covington,	  and	  Fleischer	  1985).	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When	  deciding	  which	  election	  is	  best	  to	  attempt	  a	  run	  for	  higher	  office,	  strategic	  politicians	  must	  not	  only	  weigh	  the	  probability	  of	  winning,	  but	  additionally	  must	  consider	  the	  benefits	  of	  securing	  the	  office	  that	  they	  seek,	  the	  costs	  of	  running,	  and	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  office	  they	  will	  be	  giving	  up	  (Maestas,	  Fulton,	  et	  al.	  2006).	  	  For	  this	  paper,	  the	  potential	  benefits	  of	  winning	  will	  be	  largely	  comparable,	  if	  not	  in	  fact	  equal,	  for	  all	  candidates:	  I	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  challenges	  for	  House	  seats.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  costs	  of	  running,	  though	  not	  fully	  equal,	  will	  remain	  fairly	  comparable	  for	  most	  House	  races.	  	  However,	  the	  other	  factors	  under	  consideration	  will	  differ	  significantly	  by	  individual	  and	  seat.	  	  Carson,	  Crespin,	  et	  al.	  	  (2012),	  address	  the	  question	  of	  district	  congruency	  when	  running	  for	  higher	  office,	  finding	  that	  sitting	  state	  legislators	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  choose	  to	  run,	  including	  in	  primary	  elections,	  when	  there	  is	  significant	  population	  overlap	  between	  the	  district	  they	  currently	  represent	  and	  the	  district	  they	  seek	  to	  represent.	  	  Presumably,	  they	  argue,	  this	  increased	  congruency	  bolsters	  the	  effects	  of	  incumbency	  as	  compared	  to	  a	  less	  overlapping	  district.	  	  However,	  they	  find	  that	  while	  this	  appears	  to	  affects	  the	  individual	  decision	  to	  run,	  it	  has	  little	  effect	  on	  overall	  vote	  totals.	  Two	  other	  factors	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  individual	  decision	  to	  run,	  one	  related	  to	  the	  incumbent	  and	  the	  other	  to	  state	  and	  district	  level	  effects	  on	  perceived	  rewards.	  	  Boatright	  (2013)	  looks	  at	  all	  congressional	  primaries	  from	  1970-­‐2010	  with	  an	  incumbent	  on	  the	  ballot,	  and	  classifies	  as	  competitive	  any	  challenger	  who	  receives	  at	  least	  25%	  of	  the	  vote.	  	  Rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  the	  challenger	  however,	  Boatright	  studies	  the	  incumbents	  using	  several	  electoral	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almanacs,	  and	  attempts	  to	  classify	  the	  major	  reasons	  for	  any	  primary	  challenge	  based	  on	  incumbent	  characteristics	  rather	  than	  political	  or	  economic	  conditions	  and	  partisan	  trends.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  to	  a	  significant	  extent,	  strong	  primary	  challenges	  tend	  to	  arise	  in	  response	  to	  perceived	  incumbent	  inability	  to	  continue	  to	  hold	  the	  office,	  be	  it	  through	  some	  sort	  of	  scandal,	  incompetence,	  or	  advanced	  age.	  	  In	  addition,	  though	  this	  may	  be	  correlated	  with	  perceived	  incompetency,	  candidates	  that	  appear	  to	  become	  more	  ideologically	  moderate	  than	  the	  median	  party	  voter,	  either	  through	  changes	  in	  their	  own	  voting	  behavior	  or	  from	  a	  shifting	  electorate,	  tend	  to	  face	  strong	  competition	  from	  the	  extremes	  of	  their	  party,	  especially	  Republicans.	  	  Boatright’s	  ideological	  findings	  conflict	  with	  many	  others	  (Ranney	  1968;	  Schantz	  1980;	  Grau	  1981;	  Bond,	  Fleischer,	  and	  Talbert	  1997),	  which	  find	  that	  Democrats	  have	  more	  contested	  primaries.	  	  However,	  Boatright	  focuses	  on	  incumbent	  traits	  while	  past	  studies	  have	  tended	  to	  look	  at	  structural	  factors,	  indicating	  that	  Democrats	  and	  Republicans	  may	  be	  responsive	  to	  differing	  changes.	  In	  a	  study	  of	  gubernatorial	  primary	  entry,	  Berry	  and	  Canon	  (1993)	  examine	  the	  candidate	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  of	  entering	  a	  state-­‐level	  nominating	  contest,	  focusing	  on	  the	  potential	  for	  rewards	  from	  winning,	  or	  losing,	  the	  primary,	  as	  well	  as	  party	  selection	  structures	  that	  can	  reduce	  the	  cost.	  	  Similar	  to	  previously	  outlined	  studies,	  decreased	  opposition-­‐party	  strength	  substantially	  incentivizes	  competition	  by	  increasing	  the	  ability	  to	  win	  in	  the	  general	  election,	  diminishing	  risks	  of	  the	  two-­‐stage	  electoral	  process.	  	  They	  diverge	  from	  other	  studies	  however	  by	  controlling	  for	  party	  electoral	  structures,	  such	  as	  official	  state-­‐party	  candidate	  endorsements	  prior	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to	  nomination,	  conventions,	  and	  run-­‐off	  votes	  in	  the	  event	  that	  no	  candidate	  achieves	  a	  necessary	  level	  of	  support	  in	  the	  initial	  balloting.	  	  On	  the	  cost	  side	  of	  the	  entry	  equation,	  they	  find	  that	  party	  endorsements	  and	  conventions	  encourage	  candidate	  entry,	  which	  they	  argue	  is	  mainly	  due	  to	  lessened	  campaign	  costs	  and	  increased	  access	  to	  party	  elites	  necessary	  to	  succeed	  in	  either	  model.	  	  When	  considering	  rewards,	  they	  contend	  that	  run-­‐off	  elections	  further	  incentivize	  strong	  challengers	  to	  run	  by	  providing	  a	  potential	  mechanism	  for	  perks	  even	  when	  losing.	  	  By	  bargaining	  with	  the	  candidates	  included	  in	  the	  run-­‐off,	  a	  popular	  third	  or	  fourth	  place	  candidate	  can	  in	  theory	  exchange	  their	  endorsement,	  and	  presumably	  votes	  of	  their	  supporters,	  for	  some	  sort	  of	  perk	  or	  recognition	  of	  office,	  while	  also	  providing	  an	  extra	  potential	  for	  victory	  for	  second	  place	  candidates.	  Once	  candidates	  choose	  to	  enter	  a	  primary	  race,	  whether	  for	  an	  open	  nomination	  or	  a	  challenge	  to	  an	  incumbent,	  what	  determines	  their	  success	  or	  failure?	  	  While	  partisanship	  acts	  as	  a	  very	  strong	  predictor	  of	  vote	  choice	  in	  general	  elections	  (Bartels	  2000),	  this	  is	  self-­‐evidently	  unavailable	  as	  a	  metric	  for	  primary	  voters.	  	  Of	  course,	  we	  can	  expect	  a	  significant	  incumbency	  advantage	  (Erikson	  1971;	  Gelman	  and	  King	  1990),	  with	  an	  even	  larger	  effect	  during	  a	  nominating	  contest	  than	  in	  a	  general	  election	  (Ansolabehere,	  Hansen,	  et	  al.	  2007).	  	  But	  what	  quantifiable	  factors	  are	  likely	  to	  increase	  the	  vote	  share	  of	  a	  non-­‐incumbent	  candidate,	  either	  a	  copartisan	  challenge	  to	  an	  incumbent,	  or	  a	  candidate	  seeking	  an	  unclaimed	  nomination.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  previously	  addressed	  literature	  (Jacobson	  1989;	  Hogan	  2003;	  Carson	  et	  al.	  2007),	  suggests	  that	  the	  mere	  fact	  of	  candidate	  political	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experience	  should	  bolster	  their	  vote	  share,	  as	  voters	  will	  be	  more	  aware	  of	  the	  candidate,	  and	  responsive	  to	  their	  experience.	  	  Berkman	  and	  Eisenstein	  (1999)	  examine	  the	  experience	  bonus	  for	  different	  elected	  officials	  in	  Congressional	  races,	  finding	  that	  state	  legislators	  are	  more	  risk	  averse	  when	  regarding	  a	  potential	  Congressional	  campaign	  than	  more	  local	  officials.	  	  Additionally,	  their	  findings	  suggest	  that	  when	  legislators	  do	  run,	  they	  tend	  to	  receive	  greater	  interest	  group	  and	  PAC	  support.	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  political	  experience,	  the	  literature	  is	  consistent	  on	  the	  affect	  of	  increased	  fundraising	  on	  candidate	  vote	  shares	  (Herrnson	  1992;	  Krasno,	  Green,	  and	  Cowden	  1994;	  Levitt	  1994).	  	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  we	  should	  expect	  candidates	  that	  successfully	  raise	  more	  money	  to	  perform	  better	  in	  any	  election.	  	  Maestas	  and	  Rugely	  (2008)	  argue	  that	  while	  experienced	  candidates	  do	  tend	  to	  raise	  more	  money	  than	  inexperienced	  candidates,	  in	  part	  this	  is	  a	  function	  of	  strategic	  entry.	  	  By	  seeking	  races	  where	  they	  will	  be	  more	  viable,	  they	  can	  in	  turn	  increase	  campaign	  contributions.	  	  In	  a	  study	  of	  urban	  elections,	  however,	  Krebs	  (2002)	  shows	  that	  experience	  and	  elite	  endorsements,	  can	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  helping	  candidates	  raise	  money,	  particularly	  those	  candidates	  not	  challenging	  an	  incumbent.	  	  However,	  these	  studies	  all	  focus	  on	  either	  non-­‐partisan	  or	  general	  elections,	  and	  due	  to	  differing	  incentives	  in	  primaries,	  we	  may	  see	  different	  results.	  




	   I	  gathered	  data	  primarily	  from	  a	  comprehensive	  survey	  of	  candidates	  in	  the	  2014	  midterm	  elections	  for	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  	  As	  a	  recent	  midterm	  election,	  2014	  creates	  a	  strong	  picture	  of	  the	  modern	  American	  political	  climate,	  while	  finding	  a	  balance	  between	  the	  massive	  anti-­‐incumbent	  sentiment	  that	  we	  saw	  in	  2010	  and	  more	  hopeful	  climates	  of	  other	  elections.	  	  2014	  is	  also	  more	  reflective	  of	  typical	  midterms	  by	  avoiding	  the	  problems	  of	  redistricting.	  	  Unsurprisingly,	  by	  redrawing	  congressional	  districts,	  electoral	  support	  can	  shift	  rapidly,	  as	  well	  as	  force	  incumbents	  into	  more	  precarious	  positions,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  multitude	  of	  incumbents	  defeated	  by	  their	  peers	  in	  2012.	  	  Moreover,	  with	  a	  modestly	  growing	  economy,	  but	  one	  that	  has	  expanded	  at	  different	  rates	  across	  the	  country,	  I	  can	  extrapolate	  findings	  from	  these	  different	  regions	  to	  other	  elections	  with	  similar	  economic	  climates.	  	  Additionally,	  2014	  is	  superior	  to	  previous	  elections	  by	  encompassing	  ever	  growing	  numbers	  of	  minority	  voters,	  which	  may	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  electoral	  competitiveness	  in	  primaries.	  	  Finally,	  as	  this	  election	  has	  only	  recently	  passed,	  and	  due	  to	  increased	  online	  activity	  by	  campaigns	  and	  media	  outlets,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  construct	  a	  much	  more	  comprehensive	  picture	  of	  this	  election	  cycle	  than	  many	  prior	  years,	  as	  most	  data	  can	  be	  found	  online.	  	  This	  allows	  me	  to	  gather	  superior	  and	  greater	  amounts	  of	  quantitative	  data,	  as	  well	  as	  attempt	  to	  create	  a	  qualitative	  analysis	  of	  selected	  key	  campaigns.	  	   My	  sample,	  comprising	  2272	  individuals	  was	  drawn	  initially	  from	  the	  Federal	  Election	  Commission’s	  filing	  records	  for	  all	  candidates	  for	  this	  election	  cycle.	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Because	  this	  paper	  is	  intended	  to	  study	  primary	  campaigns	  for	  the	  two	  major	  parties,	  494	  independent	  and	  third	  party	  candidates	  were	  eliminated.	  	  However,	  certain	  state	  major	  parties	  allow	  third	  parties	  candidates	  to	  appear	  on	  the	  same	  primary	  ballot,	  and	  receive	  the	  nomination	  for	  all	  represented	  parties,	  for	  example	  the	  Alaska	  Democratic-­‐Libertarian-­‐Independence	  Primary.	  	  In	  these	  states	  I	  retain	  non-­‐major	  party	  candidates,	  but	  classify	  them	  with	  whichever	  party’s	  ballot	  they	  appear	  on.	  	  Regional	  affiliates	  of	  the	  two	  major	  parties,	  such	  as	  the	  Minnesota	  Democratic-­‐Farmer-­‐Labor	  Party	  are	  also	  retained	  in	  the	  sample.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  financial	  details	  for	  each	  individual	  in	  the	  sample,	  the	  FEC	  filings	  include	  a	  three-­‐category	  classification	  of	  the	  candidate’s	  status	  within	  the	  race:	  incumbent,	  challenger,	  or	  open.	  	  Unlike	  previous	  studies,	  many	  of	  which	  do	  not	  differentiate	  between	  challengers	  based	  on	  the	  incumbent’s	  party,	  I	  do,	  classifying	  those	  who	  are	  challenging	  an	  incumbent	  outside	  of	  their	  party	  as	  “challengers”,	  and	  those	  who	  challenge	  an	  incumbent	  from	  within	  their	  own	  party	  as	  “copartisans”.	  	   Even	  within	  the	  major	  parties,	  I	  do	  not	  include	  all	  congressional	  districts	  within	  my	  sample.	  	  While	  I	  incorporate	  all	  typical	  partisan	  primaries	  –	  open,	  closed,	  or	  mixed	  –	  into	  my	  sample,	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  districts	  are	  eliminated.	  	  Excluded	  are	  three	  states,	  California,	  Louisiana,	  and	  Washington,	  which	  use	  variations	  of	  the	  non-­‐partisan	  “blanket”	  or	  “jungle”	  primary	  systems,	  where	  all	  candidates	  regardless	  of	  party	  are	  present	  on	  a	  single	  ballot,	  as	  well	  as	  Utah,	  Connecticut,	  and	  several	  districts	  of	  Virginia	  where	  candidates	  are	  nominated	  via	  party	  convention	  rather	  than	  primary	  ballot.	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   Finally,	  to	  narrow	  my	  sample	  of	  challengers,	  through	  a	  survey	  of	  state	  Secretary	  of	  State’s	  offices	  and	  election	  records,	  I	  determined	  which	  of	  the	  remaining	  candidates	  successfully	  secured	  ballot	  access.	  	  Within	  the	  FEC’s	  records	  218	  candidates	  initially	  filed	  to	  run	  for	  office,	  yet	  for	  various	  reasons	  did	  not	  end	  up	  on	  the	  final	  ballot.	  	  In	  most	  cases	  this	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  failure	  to	  qualify	  for	  the	  ballot	  e.g.,	  a	  lack	  of	  signatures,	  inability	  to	  pay	  ballot	  fees,	  etc.	  	  In	  other	  cases,	  this	  may	  be	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  initial	  support,	  unforeseen	  opposition	  –	  either	  within	  the	  primary	  or	  general	  election	  –	  or	  personal	  reasons.	  	  While	  data	  for	  these	  candidates	  is	  limited,	  in	  many	  cases	  a	  few	  filings	  were	  made	  with	  the	  FEC	  before	  the	  candidate	  chose	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  race.	  	  Consequently,	  while	  these	  individuals	  will	  not	  be	  the	  major	  subject	  of	  this	  paper,	  they	  provide	  an	  intriguing,	  and	  understudied,	  perspective	  on	  candidate	  entry,	  and	  could	  be	  a	  strong	  direction	  for	  future	  research.	  	   After	  eliminating	  all	  candidates	  from	  excluded	  states,	  those	  not	  from	  major	  parties,	  and	  any	  not	  on	  the	  ballot,	  I	  am	  left	  with	  a	  sample	  of	  1,149	  individuals:	  323	  incumbents,	  439	  cross-­‐party	  challengers,	  176	  copartisan	  challengers,	  and	  212	  candidates	  for	  open	  seats.	  	  For	  all	  races	  I	  first	  collected	  information	  regarding	  the	  2014	  elections:	  vote	  totals,	  any	  runoff	  vote	  totals,	  and	  who	  ultimately	  was	  the	  nominee.	  	  In	  a	  few	  cases,	  such	  as	  the	  GOP	  primary	  for	  Iowa’s	  3rd	  district,	  the	  candidate	  with	  the	  plurality	  of	  the	  vote	  did	  not	  ultimately	  become	  the	  nominee,	  and	  another	  was	  chosen	  at	  convention	  (special	  cases	  like	  this	  will	  be	  noted	  in	  the	  final	  analysis).	  	  Then,	  for	  each	  candidate,	  using	  a	  comprehensive	  survey	  of	  local	  news	  articles,	  candidate	  websites,	  and,	  party	  profiles,	  I	  gathered	  demographic	  information	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When Experienced Candidates Run While	  my	  total	  sample	  contains	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  1,149	  individuals	  who	  successfully	  secured	  a	  place	  on	  the	  ballot,	  before	  I	  can	  begin	  any	  sort	  of	  analysis	  it	  is	  inherently	  necessary	  to	  determine	  which	  primary	  races	  are	  competitive	  and	  which	  are	  not.	  	  For	  this	  task	  I	  use	  the	  simple	  dichotomous	  definition	  of	  primary	  competition	  used	  by	  Ansolabehere,	  et	  al.	  (2010):	  any	  race	  with	  more	  than	  one	  candidate	  on	  the	  ballot	  is	  competitive,	  while	  any	  race	  with	  only	  a	  single	  candidate	  is	  uncontested.	  	  Table	  1	  describes	  the	  breakdown	  of	  competitive	  primaries,	  and	  Table	  2	  that	  of	  uncontested	  races.	  
Table	  1:	  Candidates	  in	  Competitive	  Primaries	  By	  Challenger	  Type	  and	  Party	  Party	   Incumbents	   Copartisans	   Challengers	   Open	   Total	  Democratic	   38	   57	   147	   75	   317	  Republican	   80	   119	   140	   120	   459	  Total	   118	   176	   287	   195	   776	  	  	   Perhaps	  most	  striking,	  of	  the	  323	  incumbents	  in	  my	  sample,	  only	  36%	  face	  any	  sort	  of	  challenge	  from	  within	  their	  own	  party,	  most	  of	  those	  from	  inexperienced	  candidates.	  	  Before	  examining	  intraparty	  competition,	  I	  will	  briefly	  address	  cross-­‐party	  challenges,	  where	  we	  see	  that	  about	  two-­‐thirds	  seek	  the	  nomination	  in	  a	  contested	  primary,	  with	  the	  remaining	  one-­‐third	  unopposed.	  	  An	  examination	  of	  district	  partisanship	  confirms	  in	  this	  case	  that	  higher	  numbers	  of	  candidates	  will	  challenge	  an	  incumbent	  of	  the	  opposite	  party	  in	  less	  partisan	  districts,	  with	  an	  average	  Cook	  Rating	  of	  12.6	  in	  uncontested	  primaries,	  and	  9.5	  in	  districts	  with	  contested	  races.	  	  Within	  these	  contested	  primaries,	  an	  average	  of	  2.97	  candidates	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appear	  on	  each	  primary	  ballot	  across	  108	  congressional	  districts,	  suggesting	  at	  least	  a	  modest	  degree	  of	  intra-­‐party	  competition	  for	  seats	  held	  by	  the	  opposing	  party.	  
Table	  2:	  Candidates	  in	  Uncontested	  Primaries	  By	  Challenger	  Type	  and	  Party	  Party	   Incumbents	   Challengers	   Open	   Total	  Democratic	   98	   96	   13	   207	  Republican	   107	   55	   4	   166	  Total	   205	   151	   17	   373	  	  	   Turning	  to	  copartisan	  challenges	  to	  incumbents	  from	  within	  their	  party,	  we	  see	  an	  unusually	  low	  number	  of	  candidates	  seeking	  office	  against	  incumbents	  within	  their	  party.	  	  Because	  copartisan	  challengers	  are	  by	  definition	  participating	  in	  a	  contested	  election,	  it	  is	  impossible	  in	  this	  case	  to	  make	  a	  comparison	  with	  uncontested	  copartisan	  candidates,	  though	  the	  number	  of	  unchallenged	  incumbents	  provides	  evidence	  enough.	  	  Of	  the	  118	  primary	  races	  of	  this	  type,	  an	  average	  of	  3.06	  candidates,	  including	  incumbents,	  appear	  on	  each	  ballot.	  	  However,	  when	  compared	  to	  cross-­‐party	  challenges	  we	  see	  more	  heavily	  contested	  outlier	  races,	  such	  as	  Tennessee	  district	  4,	  represented	  by	  Republican	  Scott	  DesJarlais,	  who	  faced	  six	  opponents	  (one	  experienced),	  Texas	  district	  4,	  represented	  by	  Republican	  Ralph	  Hall,	  who	  faced	  five	  opponents	  (two	  experienced),	  and	  Massachusetts	  district	  6,	  represented	  by	  Democrat	  John	  Tierney,	  who	  faced	  four	  opponents	  (none	  experienced).	  	  These	  three	  races	  were	  all	  characterized	  by	  personal	  attributes	  of	  the	  incumbent,	  which	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	  their	  perceived	  chances	  of	  defeat.	  	   Finally,	  examining	  open	  races,	  we	  can	  expect	  to	  observe	  the	  highest	  relative	  number	  of	  candidates,	  as	  this	  represents	  the	  most	  auspicious	  chance	  for	  most	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potential	  office	  seekers.	  	  Despite	  this	  however,	  we	  observe	  a	  strikingly	  high	  number	  of	  unopposed	  candidates	  in	  these	  races,	  with	  seventeen	  receiving	  their	  party’s	  nomination	  uncontested.	  	  Despite	  this,	  across	  the	  33	  contested	  primaries	  for	  these	  seats,	  an	  average	  of	  5.42	  candidates	  file	  for	  each	  ballot,	  a	  number	  significantly	  higher	  than	  that	  observed	  for	  held	  seats.	  	  
Table	  3:	  Experience	  By	  Challenger	  Type,	  All	  Candidates	  Type	  of	  Challenge	   Inexperienced	   Experienced	   Total	  Open	   95	  (148)	   100	  (47)	   195	  Challenger	   246	  (218)	   41	  (69)	   287	  Copartisan	   159	  (134)	   17	  (42)	   176	  Total	   500	   158	   658	  Expected	  values	  reported	  in	  parentheses.	  Χ2=114.226,	  p=0.00	  	  	   I	  begin	  my	  analysis	  with	  a	  simple	  chi-­‐squared	  test	  of	  independence	  (Table	  3),	  which	  confirms	  past	  research	  in	  strategic	  entry	  theory:	  when	  breaking	  down	  all	  primary	  candidates	  by	  prior	  political	  experience	  and	  the	  partisan	  status	  of	  the	  incumbent,	  we	  see	  a	  clear	  correlation	  between	  candidate	  strength	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  incumbents	  on	  the	  ballot.	  	  Inexperienced	  candidates	  tend	  to	  challenge	  incumbents	  at	  a	  higher	  than	  expected	  rate,	  while	  those	  with	  experience	  either	  wait	  for	  an	  open	  seat	  or	  a	  more	  ideal	  time	  to	  seek	  office.	  	  When	  further	  breaking	  down	  these	  results	  by	  party	  affiliation	  (Tables	  4	  and	  5),	  we	  see	  similar	  trends.	  	  While	  these	  results	  do	  not	  differentiate	  between	  challengers	  and	  copartisans,	  perhaps	  the	  strongest	  indicator	  of	  incumbent	  checks	  against	  challengers	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  raw	  numbers:	  in	  2014,	  of	  the	  323	  incumbents	  within	  my	  sample,	  205	  did	  not	  face	  any	  sort	  of	  primary	  challenge,	  compared	  with	  only	  30	  unopposed	  candidates	  in	  the	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general	  election.	  	  Though	  this	  may	  be	  due	  to	  party	  loyalty,	  there	  is	  certainly	  a	  strategic	  element	  as	  well.	  
Table	  4:	  Experience	  By	  Challenger	  Type,	  Democrats	  Type	  of	  Challenge	   Inexperienced	   Experienced	   Total	  Open	   29	  (57)	   46	  (18)	   75	  Challenger	   132	  (112)	   15	  (35)	   147	  Copartisan	   51	  (43)	   6	  (17)	   57	  Total	   212	   67	   279	  Expected	  Values	  Reported	  in	  Parentheses.	  Χ2=78.290,	  p=0.00	  
	  
Table	  5:	  Experience	  By	  Challenger	  Type,	  Republicans	  Type	  of	  Challenge	   Inexperienced	   Experienced	   Total	  Open	   66	  (91)	   54	  (29)	   120	  Challenger	   114	  (106)	   26	  (34)	   140	  Copartisan	   108	  (91)	   11	  (28)	   119	  Total	   288	   91	   379	  Expected	  Values	  Reported	  in	  Parentheses.	  Χ2=45.468,	  p=0.00	  	   Though	  some	  scholars	  (Bond,	  Covington,	  and	  Fleisher	  1985;	  Krasno	  and	  Green	  1988;	  Stewart	  1989)	  scale	  the	  value	  of	  prior	  political	  experience	  based	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  office	  held	  and	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  district	  population	  represented	  by	  that	  office,	  I	  use	  the	  same	  binary	  as	  other	  scholars	  (Jacobson	  and	  Kernell	  1981;	  Born	  1986;	  Squire	  1992,	  Lublin	  1994)	  when	  classifying	  candidates	  as	  strong	  or	  weak.	  	  In	  those	  studies	  using	  a	  scaled	  variable,	  the	  contested	  office	  is	  typically	  higher,	  generally	  either	  a	  gubernatorial	  or	  Senate	  seat,	  and	  candidates	  tend	  to	  come	  from	  all	  levels	  of	  political	  life.	  	  Additionally,	  when	  a	  race	  takes	  place	  on	  the	  statewide	  level,	  it	  is	  relatively	  simple	  to	  determine	  the	  portion	  of	  the	  population	  represented	  by	  the	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candidate	  in	  question.	  	  When	  studying	  House	  primaries	  however,	  these	  factors	  are	  less	  impactful.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  level	  of	  the	  seat	  held,	  almost	  all	  experienced	  candidates	  in	  this	  data	  set	  come	  from	  either	  the	  state	  legislature	  or	  local	  office,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  thirteen	  former	  members	  of	  congress	  who	  were	  seeking	  to	  regain	  their	  old	  seats.	  	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  former	  members,	  who	  only	  make	  up	  a	  very	  small	  subsample	  of	  my	  data	  –	  and	  who	  are	  all	  challenging	  an	  incumbent	  of	  the	  opposing	  party	  –	  there	  is	  little	  large-­‐scale	  distinction	  amongst	  the	  challengers	  offices,	  and	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  a	  congressional	  race	  they	  fit	  within	  Jacobson’s	  binary	  classification	  scheme.	  	  Unlike	  statewide	  races,	  it	  is	  a	  complex	  process	  to	  measure	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  district	  population	  represented,	  as	  congressional	  and	  state	  legislative	  districts	  do	  not	  always	  completely	  overlap,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  perceived	  benefits	  from	  name	  recognition	  may	  be	  lost.	  	  However,	  the	  more	  tangible	  benefits	  from	  connections	  and	  resources	  should	  still	  be	  present.	  
Table	  6:	  Effect	  of	  Challenger	  Type	  on	  Experienced	  Candidates,	  All	  Candidates	  	   (1)	  Challenger	   -­‐1.843***	  	   (0.221)	  Copartisan	   -­‐2.287***	  	   (0.293)	  Constant	   0.0513	  	   (0.143)	  Observations	   658	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	  	   Using	  this	  experience	  as	  a	  binary	  variable	  allows	  me	  to	  estimate	  the	  chances	  of	  an	  experienced	  candidate	  running	  in	  a	  given	  congressional	  race,	  and	  thus	  I	  use	  prior	  political	  as	  my	  dependent	  variable.	  	  In	  Table	  6,	  I	  display	  the	  results	  of	  a	  logit	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regression	  of	  an	  independent	  set	  of	  dummy	  variables	  using	  open	  seat	  primaries	  as	  a	  baseline,	  with	  a	  significant	  negative	  coefficient.	  	  	  	  For	  all	  candidates,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  predict	  the	  likelihood	  of	  an	  ambitious	  politician	  seeking	  an	  open	  seat,	  especially	  taking	  into	  account	  other	  factors	  in	  the	  race,	  such	  as	  competing	  candidates,	  potential	  donors,	  and	  personal	  reasons.	  	  However,	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  incumbent,	  of	  either	  party,	  significantly	  reduces	  the	  chances	  of	  an	  experienced	  challenger	  arising.	  	  Interestingly,	  the	  “scare-­‐off”	  factor	  does	  not	  differ	  substantially	  for	  co	  and	  anti-­‐partisan	  challengers,	  with	  strategic	  challengers	  from	  within	  an	  incumbent’s	  party	  only	  marginally	  less	  likely	  to	  run	  than	  those	  opposing	  the	  incumbent’s	  party.	  	  	  These	  results	  have	  little	  to	  say	  about	  the	  likelihood	  of	  inexperienced	  challengers.	  	  
Table	  7:	  Effect	  of	  Challenger	  Type	  on	  Experienced	  Candidates,	  Democrats	  	   (1)	  Challenger	   -­‐2.636***	  	   (0.361)	  Copartisan	   -­‐2.601***	  	   (0.492)	  Constant	   0.461*	  	   (0.237)	  Observations	   279	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	  	  	   Furthermore,	  when	  breaking	  down	  the	  results	  by	  party	  in	  Tables	  7	  and	  8,	  we	  see	  interesting	  differences	  in	  the	  likelihood	  of	  an	  experienced	  candidacy.	  	  According	  to	  this	  analysis,	  experienced	  Democrats	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  run	  in	  an	  open	  race	  than	  experienced	  Republicans.	  	  Conversely,	  experienced	  Republicans	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  challenge	  an	  incumbent	  Democrat	  than	  vice	  versa,	  though	  perhaps	  this	  is	  related	  to	  the	  anti-­‐Democratic	  mood	  observed	  during	  the	  later	  general	  election.	  	  Most	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interestingly,	  based	  on	  these	  data	  it	  appears	  that	  strong	  Republican	  potential	  candidates	  are	  more	  inclined	  to	  enter	  the	  race	  against	  incumbents	  of	  their	  own	  party	  than	  their	  Democratic	  counterparts.	  	  This	  is	  due	  to	  higher	  levels	  of	  anti-­‐incumbent	  and	  anti-­‐establishment	  sentiment	  within	  the	  Republican	  electorate,	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  Tea	  Party.	  	  	  	  
Table	  8:	  Effect	  of	  Challenger	  Type	  on	  Experienced	  Candidates,	  Republicans	  	   (1)	  1.seat_held	   -­‐1.277***	  	   (0.284)	  2.seat_held	   -­‐2.084***	  	   (0.366)	  Constant	   -­‐0.201	  	   (0.183)	  Observations	   379	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	  	  	   Here,	  I	  expand	  my	  search	  beyond	  the	  type	  of	  challenge	  being	  put	  forward	  to	  look	  at	  specific	  district	  level	  variables,	  as	  well	  as	  incumbent	  characteristics.	  	  Needless	  to	  say,	  I	  exclude	  incumbent	  characteristics	  from	  my	  analysis	  of	  open	  seat	  primaries.	  	  My	  first	  consideration	  is	  incumbent	  popularity.	  	  While	  that	  may	  be	  a	  stronger	  predictor	  of	  an	  experienced	  cross-­‐party	  general	  election	  challenger,	  or	  those	  who	  I	  classify	  as	  “challengers”,	  in	  theory	  an	  unpopular	  incumbent	  could	  attract	  challengers	  from	  either	  party.	  	  Given	  the	  difficulty	  of	  defeating	  an	  incumbent	  in	  a	  primary	  challenge,	  attempting	  to	  oust	  them	  during	  a	  period	  of	  district	  discontent,	  even	  within	  the	  same	  party	  and	  at	  risk	  of	  losing	  the	  general	  election,	  could	  be	  an	  ambitious	  politicians’	  best	  chance	  to	  seek	  advancement.	  	  However,	  because	  approval	  ratings	  of	  typical	  members	  of	  Congress	  are	  not	  tracked	  to	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anywhere	  near	  the	  same	  extent	  as	  the	  president’s,	  a	  pre-­‐election	  measure	  is	  unavailable	  for	  most	  incumbents.	  	  Instead	  of	  approval	  rating,	  I	  attempt	  to	  measure	  incumbent	  popularity	  through	  their	  margin	  of	  victory	  in	  the	  past	  election.	  	  Though	  in	  some	  cases	  incumbent	  popularity	  may	  have	  changed	  between	  elections,	  this	  is	  a	  good	  proxy,	  and	  one	  that	  would	  be	  available	  to	  strategic	  challengers,	  because	  it	  represents	  an	  objective	  measure	  of	  voter	  intention.	  	  Moreover,	  because	  the	  decision	  to	  run	  for	  office	  must	  be	  made	  well	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  election	  itself	  due	  to	  fundraising	  needs,	  the	  time	  required	  to	  build	  a	  campaign,	  and	  filing	  deadlines,	  experienced	  candidates	  may	  use	  electoral	  margins	  as	  an	  early	  signal	  in	  making	  their	  decision.	  	   In	  addition	  to	  popularity	  as	  a	  metric	  for	  individual	  incumbents,	  I	  am	  also	  interested	  in	  the	  incumbent	  ideology,	  particularly	  as	  it	  is	  compared	  to	  that	  of	  the	  party	  structure	  and	  base.	  	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  more	  ideologically	  extreme	  incumbents	  are	  significantly	  less	  likely	  to	  face	  a	  strong	  interparty	  challenge	  as	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  I	  expect	  primary	  electorates	  to	  be	  more	  receptive	  to	  candidates	  farther	  from	  the	  center,	  allowing	  an	  opening	  for	  a	  contested	  nomination.	  	  For	  primaries	  opposing	  the	  incumbent’s	  party,	  I	  expect	  to	  see	  a	  much	  weaker	  relationship	  between	  ideological	  extremism	  and	  strategic	  challenges:	  while	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  ambitious	  cross-­‐party	  challengers	  will	  seek	  to	  challenge	  an	  extremist	  opponent	  –	  giving	  them	  room	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  centrist	  vote	  –	  I	  expect	  these	  individuals	  to	  remain	  much	  more	  sensitive	  to	  indicators	  of	  incumbent	  strength,	  as	  even	  the	  most	  extreme	  incumbents	  have	  for	  the	  most	  part	  already	  been	  elected	  at	  least	  once.	  	  To	  measure	  incumbent	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ideological	  extremism	  I	  use	  the	  same	  modified	  DW-­‐NOMINATE	  scale	  as	  Pyeatt	  (2013).	  	  Rather	  than	  the	  standard	  negative-­‐positive	  scale,	  I	  utilize	  the	  absolute	  value	  of	  each	  incumbent’s	  score	  to	  measure	  their	  distance	  from	  the	  center,	  so	  that	  moderates	  are	  low	  values	  close	  the	  zero,	  and	  more	  extreme	  candidates	  close	  to	  one.	  	  Using	  the	  standard	  scale	  from	  liberal	  to	  conservative,	  I	  would	  expect	  to	  achieve	  null	  results,	  as	  the	  most	  liberal	  Democrats	  (-­‐1	  on	  a	  traditional	  DW-­‐NOMINATE	  scale),	  and	  the	  most	  conservative	  Republicans	  (1	  on	  that	  scale),	  would	  effectively	  cancel	  each	  other	  out.	  	  By	  using	  an	  absolute	  scale,	  I	  can	  account	  for	  intra-­‐party	  ideological	  differences	  without	  inter-­‐party	  divisions.	  	  Moreover,	  since	  I	  do	  not	  expect	  to	  see	  party	  differences	  in	  ambition,	  this	  metric	  should	  not	  miss	  key	  results.	  	   Besides	  individual	  level	  incumbent	  characteristics,	  I	  also	  use	  several	  district-­‐based	  variables,	  ones	  that	  any	  potential	  candidate	  would	  certainly	  be	  aware	  of.	  	  First,	  I	  imagine	  that	  ambitious	  candidates	  are	  mindful	  of	  district	  partisanship.	  	  Both	  to	  facilitate	  their	  own	  ambition,	  as	  well	  as	  protect	  party	  prospects,	  I	  hypothesize	  a	  higher	  probability	  of	  seeing	  a	  strong	  copartisan	  challenge	  in	  highly	  partisan	  “safe”	  districts,	  and	  more	  copartisan	  challenges	  in	  centrist	  “swing”	  districts.	  	  For	  ambitious	  politicians,	  a	  safe	  seat	  reduces	  the	  degree	  of	  competition,	  requiring	  individual	  candidates	  to	  only	  contest	  a	  primary,	  rather	  than	  a	  general	  election	  as	  well.	  	  Moreover,	  because	  they	  can	  count	  on	  victory	  in	  a	  highly	  partisan	  seat,	  ambitious	  challengers	  can	  devote	  more	  resources	  to	  the	  primary,	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  greater	  resources	  and	  connections	  from	  within	  the	  established	  party.	  	  Additionally,	  we	  can	  expect	  experienced	  candidates,	  those	  who	  have	  worked	  within	  the	  party	  structure	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in	  the	  past,	  to	  have	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  party-­‐loyalty	  as	  compared	  to	  amateur	  candidates.	  	  As	  such,	  more	  of	  these	  candidates	  may	  be	  incentivized	  to	  run	  for	  safe	  seats,	  as	  there	  is	  a	  reduced	  chance	  of	  jeopardizing	  their	  party’s	  hold	  on	  the	  seat	  in	  the	  general	  election.	  	  In	  order	  to	  measure	  district	  partisanship,	  I	  use	  the	  2014	  Cook	  Political	  Report	  Partisan	  Index.	  	  Similar	  to	  my	  measurement	  of	  incumbent	  ideology,	  I	  rescale	  the	  index	  to	  its	  absolute	  values,	  as	  a	  metric	  of	  district	  distance	  from	  the	  national	  center.	  	   Finally,	  I	  measure	  district	  unemployment,	  as	  another	  potential	  indicator	  of	  incumbent	  unhappiness	  available	  to	  challengers.	  	  Consistent	  with	  previous	  research	  indicating	  that	  voters	  are	  responsive	  to	  poor	  economic	  factors,	  and	  consequently	  punish	  incumbents	  (Lewis-­‐Beck	  and	  Stegmaier,	  2000)	  I	  expect	  that	  strategic	  and	  ambitious	  candidates	  will	  be	  aware	  of	  this	  relationship,	  and	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  seek	  office	  during	  times	  of	  high	  unemployment.	  	  Additionally,	  while	  I	  expect	  this	  effect	  to	  occur	  for	  both	  challengers	  and	  copartisans,	  it	  will	  likely	  be	  stronger	  for	  cross-­‐party	  challengers.	  	  I	  gather	  data	  on	  district-­‐level	  unemployment	  from	  the	  American	  Community	  Survey.	  	   In	  order	  to	  measure	  differential	  effects	  on	  candidate	  incentives	  based	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  incumbent	  on	  a	  ballot,	  I	  create	  three	  dichotomous	  dummy	  variables,	  “Challenger”,	  “Copartisan”,	  and	  “Open”,	  each	  coded	  1	  for	  candidates	  on	  those	  ballots,	  and	  0	  for	  all	  others,	  including	  incumbents.	  	  I	  begin	  with	  an	  “all”	  model,	  using	  each	  of	  my	  independent	  variables	  without	  any	  interactive	  effects.	  	  For	  each	  subgroup	  of	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candidates,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  individual	  independent	  variables,	  I	  interact	  all	  four	  with	  the	  dummy	  variable	  of	  the	  selected	  model.	  Based	  on	  a	  multivariate	  logit	  regression,	  for	  all	  incumbents,	  the	  factors	  determining	  a	  strong	  candidate	  run	  for	  office	  are	  largely	  significant,	  and	  displayed	  in	  Table	  9.	  	  Unsurprisingly,	  incumbent	  margin	  of	  victory	  in	  the	  previous	  election	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  de-­‐incentivizing	  strong	  challengers.	  	  Incumbent	  ideological	  distance	  from	  the	  center	  also	  strongly	  reduces	  that	  likelihood.	  	  Contrary	  to	  expectations,	  a	  higher	  unemployment	  rate	  appears	  to	  reduce,	  rather	  than	  attract,	  strong	  challengers.	  	  While	  this	  finding	  may	  be	  due	  to	  a	  small	  sample	  size,	  this	  could	  reflect	  at	  tendency	  among	  candidates	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  general,	  rather	  than	  primary	  election.	  	  A	  low	  unemployment	  rate	  could	  bolster	  the	  incumbent	  party’s	  chances	  in	  November,	  and	  act	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  potential	  general	  election	  strength,	  rather	  than	  incumbent	  weakness.	  	  For	  cross-­‐party	  challenges,	  district	  partisanship	  and	  incumbent	  ideology	  are	  key,	  as	  we	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  see	  a	  strong	  challenge	  in	  a	  centrist	  district,	  while	  incumbent	  ideological	  extremity	  reduces	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  strong	  challenge.3	  	  Open	  races	  exhibit	  predictable	  findings,	  indicating	  that	  potential	  candidates	  do	  not	  significantly	  take	  district	  partisanship	  into	  account,	  suggesting	  that	  despite	  its	  statistical	  significance,	  potential	  candidates	  for	  open	  seats	  are	  non-­‐responsive	  to	  district	  partisanship.	  	  Unemployment	  also	  acts	  as	  predicted	  in	  this	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  It	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  an	  interaction	  exists	  between	  these	  two	  variables,	  which	  I	  could	  test	  for	  in	  a	  future	  model.	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Table	  9:	  Likelihood	  of	  Experienced	  Challenger,	  All	  Candidates	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   All	   Challenger	   Copartisan	   Open	  	   	   	   	   	  Challenger	   	   -­‐0.0230	   	   	  	   	   (1.104)	   	   	  Incumbent	  Margin	   -­‐0.0122*	   -­‐0.0126*	   -­‐0.0140*	   	  	   (0.00639)	   (0.00730)	   (0.00751)	   	  Margin*Challenger	   	   -­‐0.00368	   	   	  	   	   (0.0193)	   	   	  District	  Partisanship	   0.0245	   0.0222	   0.0299	   -­‐0.0529**	  	   (0.0171)	   (0.0186)	   (0.0196)	   (0.0207)	  Partisanship*Challenger	   	   -­‐0.168***	   	   	  	   	   (0.0617)	   	   	  Ideological	  Extremism	   -­‐1.379***	   -­‐1.404***	   -­‐1.117**	   	  	   (0.426)	   (0.538)	   (0.452)	   	  Extremism*Challenger	   	   0.316	   	   	  	   	   (0.963)	   	   	  Unemployment	  Rate	   -­‐0.134**	   -­‐0.0857	   -­‐0.166***	   0.0392	  	   (0.0537)	   (0.0633)	   (0.0615)	   (0.0784)	  Unemployment*Challenger	   	   -­‐0.0117	   	   	  	   	   (0.136)	   	   	  Copartisan	   	   	   -­‐4.597***	   	  	   	   	   (1.727)	   	  Margin*Copartisan	   	   	   0.0142	   	  	   	   	   (0.0162)	   	  Partisanship*Copartisan	   	   	   0.0118	   	  	   	   	   (0.0468)	   	  Extremism*Copartisan	   	   	   1.071	   	  	   	   	   (1.590)	   	  Unemployment*Copartisan	   	   	   0.257*	   	  	   	   	   (0.147)	   	  Open	   	   	   	   2.169***	  	   	   	   	   (0.752)	  Partisanship*Open	   	   	   	   0.0517*	  	   	   	   	   (0.0285)	  Unemployment*Open	   	   	   	   -­‐0.105	  	   	   	   	   (0.111)	  Constant	   0.623	   0.774	   0.918*	   -­‐1.657***	  	   (0.458)	   (0.561)	   (0.496)	   (0.555)	  	   	   	   	   	  Observations	   658	   658	   658	   658	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	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   situation,	  providing	  a	  small	  incentive	  to	  potential	  experienced	  candidates,	  as	  well	  perhaps	  as	  being	  an	  initial	  cause	  of	  the	  incumbent	  decision	  not	  to	  run	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  Examining	  intra-­‐party	  challenges	  reveals	  interesting	  results	  (Tables	  10	  and	  11).	  	  While	  I	  would	  expect	  a	  higher	  incumbent	  margin	  of	  victory	  to	  play	  some	  role	  in	  incentivizing	  copartisan	  challenges,	  as	  it	  could	  indicate	  a	  safer	  general	  election	  contest	  should	  the	  challenger	  win,	  the	  data	  appears	  to	  indicate	  otherwise.	  	  In	  theory,	  district	  partisanship	  could	  act	  as	  a	  stronger	  indicator	  in	  this	  regard	  as	  well,	  particularly	  for	  a	  more	  ideological	  extreme	  candidate	  seeking	  office	  in	  a	  highly	  partisan	  district.	  	  However,	  since	  there	  is	  no	  consistent	  ideological	  measure	  available	  for	  Congressional	  candidates	  who	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  elected	  –	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  my	  sample	  –	  this	  measure	  is	  impossible.	  	  As	  such,	  I	  observe	  very	  little	  predictive	  effect	  from	  this	  measure	  either.	  	  I	  do,	  however,	  see	  a	  large	  and	  significant	  impact	  stemming	  from	  incumbent	  ideological	  extremism.	  	  Though	  this	  measure	  seems	  to	  affect	  the	  likelihood	  of	  an	  experienced	  challenger	  seeking	  office	  across	  all	  races,	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  particularly	  powerful	  predictor	  when	  looking	  at	  challenges	  from	  within	  the	  incumbent’s	  party.	  	  As	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  later,	  this	  effect	  is	  in	  fact	  likely	  mitigated	  when	  analyzing	  both	  parties	  together,	  and	  should	  be	  more	  powerful	  when	  considering	  Democrats	  and	  Republicans	  separately.	  	  Considering	  recent	  trends	  in	  increasing	  ideological	  polarization	  and	  the	  decline	  of	  centrist	  legislators,	  this	  finding	  is	  particularly	  unsurprising.	  	  Finally,	  though	  unemployment	  provides	  a	  non-­‐ideological	  metric	  that	  voters	  and	  ambitious	  politicians	  could	  use	  as	  an	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indicator	  of	  incumbent	  success,	  higher	  levels	  of	  unemployment	  appear	  to	  provide	  only	  a	  very	  meager	  incentive	  for	  strong	  candidates	  to	  run,	  and	  a	  smaller	  incentive	  than	  I	  observe	  for	  cross-­‐party	  challenges.	  
	  	   Using	  CLARIFY	  (Tomz,	  Wittenberg,	  and	  King	  2003),	  I	  perform	  a	  predicted	  probabilities	  analysis	  to	  estimate	  the	  likelihood	  of	  an	  experienced	  challenger	  in	  any	  given	  race,	  regardless	  of	  party.	  	  The	  results	  are	  displayed	  in	  Figure	  1.	  	  Using	  mean	  values	  for	  all	  variables,	  I	  generate	  a	  baseline	  probability	  of	  21%	  that	  an	  experienced	  candidate	  will	  seek	  office	  in	  any	  given	  race,	  regardless	  of	  their	  party	  affiliation	  relative	  to	  the	  incumbent.	  	  By	  controlling	  for	  the	  cross-­‐party	  vs.	  intra-­‐party	  challenges,	  I	  can	  estimate	  the	  probability	  of	  strong	  and	  ambitious	  candidates	  running	  for	  the	  House.	  	  By	  setting	  incumbent	  ideological	  extremism	  to	  its	  lowest	  value	  (.042)	  in	  my	  transformed	  DW-­‐NOMINATE	  scale,	  I	  estimate	  a	  56%	  chance	  of	  an	  experienced	  candidate	  seeking	  their	  party’s	  nomination	  to	  challenge	  the	  incumbent	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in	  a	  general	  election,	  compared	  with	  a	  4%	  chance	  of	  an	  experienced	  candidate	  seeking	  to	  oust	  a	  moderate	  incumbent	  of	  their	  own	  party.	  	  By	  contrast,	  when	  using	  the	  highest	  extremism	  value	  (1.234)	  I	  estimate	  a	  32%	  chance	  of	  observing	  a	  strong	  challenge	  across	  party	  lines,	  though	  this	  finding	  lacks	  the	  same	  statistical	  significance	  as	  my	  others.	  	  I	  only	  find	  a	  2%	  probability	  of	  an	  extreme	  partisan	  facing	  a	  strong	  challenge	  from	  within	  his	  or	  her	  own	  party.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  confirming	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  ideology	  plays	  a	  major	  role	  in	  encouraging	  intra-­‐party	  primary	  challenges,	  I	  observe	  that	  it	  has	  a	  substantial	  affect	  on	  cross	  party	  challenges	  as	  well.	  	  Despite	  the	  low	  magnitude	  of	  my	  interparty	  findings,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  most	  extreme	  incumbents	  are	  only	  half	  as	  likely	  to	  face	  primary	  challenges.	  	   By	  breaking	  down	  my	  results	  by	  party	  affiliation,	  I	  can	  attempt	  to	  eliminate	  any	  lingering	  effects	  on	  my	  pre-­‐interaction	  coefficients	  from	  challengers	  on	  copartisan	  races,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  	  In	  my	  dual	  party	  model,	  many	  incumbents	  are	  included	  twice:	  Democrats	  facing	  challenges	  from	  within	  their	  party	  as	  well	  as	  from	  Republicans,	  and	  Republicans	  facing	  the	  same,	  which	  may	  have	  some	  small	  impact	  on	  findings	  before	  taking	  into	  account	  my	  challenger	  type	  interaction.	  	  Using	  party	  subsets,	  I	  can	  ensure	  that	  incumbents	  and	  district	  characteristics	  are	  only	  relevant	  for	  one	  of	  my	  models,	  challenger,	  copartisan,	  or	  open,	  rather	  than	  all	  three,	  likely	  producing	  stronger	  results.	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Table	  11:	  Likelihood	  of	  Experienced	  Challenger,	  Republicans	  
	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   All	   Challenger	   Copartisan	   Open	  Challenger	   	   1.338	   	   	  	   	   (1.603)	   	   	  Incumbent	  Margin	   -­‐0.0280***	   -­‐0.0190**	   -­‐0.0578***	   	  	   (0.0101)	   (0.00965)	   (0.0159)	   	  Margin*Challenger	   	   -­‐0.00632	   	   	  	   	   (0.0333)	   	   	  District	  Partisanship	   -­‐0.0117	   -­‐0.00859	   -­‐0.0235	   -­‐0.0974***	  	   (0.0254)	   (0.0252)	   (0.0319)	   (0.0295)	  Partisanship*Challenger	   	   -­‐0.160	   	   	  	   	   (0.111)	   	   	  Ideological	  Extremism	   0.644	   0.154	   3.475***	   	  	   (0.600)	   (0.784)	   (0.825)	   	  Extremism*Challenger	   	   -­‐5.941*	   	   	  	   	   (3.344)	   	   	  Unemployment	  Rate	   -­‐0.145*	   -­‐0.105	   -­‐0.112	   0.00463	  	   (0.0828)	   (0.109)	   (0.100)	   (0.102)	  Unemployment*Challenger	   	   0.0903	   	   	  	   	   (0.190)	   	   	  Copartisan	   	   	   -­‐2.457	   	  	   	   	   (2.484)	   	  Margin*Copartisan	   	   	   0.0539**	   	  	   	   	   (0.0234)	   	  Partisanship*Copartisan	   	   	   0.0668	   	  	   	   	   (0.0638)	   	  Extremism*Copartisan	   	   	   -­‐5.198***	   	  	   	   	   (1.950)	   	  Unemployment*Copartisan	   	   	   0.266	   	  	   	   	   (0.240)	   	  Open	   	   	   	   2.814**	  	   	   	   	   (1.194)	  Partisanship*Open	   	   	   	   0.0736*	  	   	   	   	   (0.0380)	  Unemployment*Open	   	   	   	   -­‐0.290	  	   	   	   	   (0.178)	  Constant	   0.336	   0.268	   -­‐0.173	   -­‐0.902	  	   (0.674)	   (0.898)	   (0.792)	   (0.735)	  	   	   	   	   	  Observations	   379	   379	   379	   379	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	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   My	  first	  consequential	  finding	  based	  on	  party	  subsets	  within	  my	  sample	  is	  the	  constant	  coefficient,	  suggesting	  that,	  all	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  experienced	  Democrats	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  present	  challenges	  than	  their	  Republican	  counterparts,	  particularly	  towards	  incumbents	  of	  their	  own	  party.	  	  Cross-­‐party	  challengers	  appear	  to	  behave	  fairly	  similarly	  across	  parties,	  though	  Republicans	  may	  be	  slightly	  more	  sensitive	  to	  incumbent	  margins.	  	  This	  finding	  is	  possibly	  due	  to	  low	  margins	  acting	  as	  a	  slightly	  stronger	  signal	  of	  incumbent	  Democrat	  strength	  in	  2012,	  following	  the	  largely	  Republican	  led	  redistricting	  plan	  and	  President	  Obama’s	  reelection.	  Additionally,	  ambitious	  Democrats	  appear	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  challenge	  more	  conservative	  Republicans	  than	  vice	  versa,	  perhaps	  due	  to	  a	  perception	  that	  recently	  elected	  Tea	  Party	  Republicans	  may	  be	  vulnerable.	  	  Alternatively,	  potential	  	  Republican	  challengers	  may	  be	  more	  risk	  averse	  towards	  challenging	  the	  most	  liberal	  Democrats,	  also	  due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  Tea	  Party:	  it	  is	  not	  inconceivable	  that	  the	  incumbent	  liberal	  Democrats	  who	  survived	  the	  Tea	  Party	  wave	  in	  2010	  are	  possibly	  the	  most	  secure	  in	  their	  seats,	  and	  consequently	  deter	  ambitious	  Republican	  candidates.	  	   As	  I	  am	  primarily	  interested	  in	  primary	  challenges	  to	  incumbents	  from	  within	  their	  own	  party,	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  differences	  in	  copartisan	  contests	  between	  Democrats	  and	  Republicans.	  	  For	  both	  parties,	  the	  incumbent’s	  margin	  of	  victory	  appears	  to	  have	  very	  little	  impact	  on	  any	  potential	  experienced	  candidate’s	  decision	  to	  run,	  as	  does	  the	  level	  of	  district	  partisanship,	  both	  characteristics	  of	  incumbent	  safety	  and	  party	  prospects.	  	  In	  itself,	  this	  does	  tell	  us	  something	  about	  intra-­‐party	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ambitions	  for	  higher	  office:	  contrary	  to	  expectations,	  a	  null	  result	  suggests	  in	  fact	  that	  strategically	  ambitious	  and	  experienced	  politicians	  may	  not	  have	  a	  huge	  sense	  of	  party	  loyalty,	  willing	  to	  defeat	  an	  incumbent	  they	  disagree	  with	  regardless	  of	  the	  potential	  to	  jeopardize	  the	  party’s	  hold	  over	  that	  seat	  in	  the	  general	  election.	  	  Similarly,	  unemployment	  also	  lacks	  much	  predictive	  power.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  both	  parties	  however,	  as	  predicted	  when	  using	  party	  subsets,	  the	  impact	  of	  incumbent	  ideology	  increases	  remarkably.	  	  For	  Republicans	  in	  particular,	  the	  most	  ideologically	  moderate	  incumbents	  are	  the	  most	  likely	  to	  face	  primary	  challenges	  from	  experienced	  candidates.	  	  My	  findings	  suggest	  that	  this	  effect	  is	  similar	  for	  Democrats,	  however	  the	  low	  number	  of	  Democratic	  incumbents	  facing	  primary	  challenges	  creates	  problems	  attaining	  statistical	  significance.	  	  While	  the	  conventional	  wisdom	  says	  that	  these	  ideological	  challenges,	  such	  as	  from	  the	  Tea	  Party,	  tend	  to	  come	  from	  non-­‐political	  “insurgent”	  candidates,	  my	  findings	  suggest	  that	  strong	  and	  ambitious	  officials	  are	  also	  ideological	  conscious,	  and	  work	  within	  these	  same	  anti-­‐moderate	  and	  anti-­‐establishment	  structures.	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How Experienced Candidates Perform From	  here,	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  question	  of	  candidate	  selection	  within	  primary	  contests.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  indicators	  that	  may	  be	  used	  to	  decide	  in	  a	  general	  election,	  such	  as	  party	  identification,	  are	  not	  relevant	  to	  a	  primary	  voter,	  and	  others,	  such	  as	  ideological	  differences,	  may	  not	  be	  readily	  obvious.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  non-­‐incumbents,	  no	  meaningful	  metric	  exists	  to	  measure	  ideological	  difference	  for	  all	  candidates,	  and	  even	  if	  one	  was	  in	  common	  use,	  such	  differentiation	  may	  not	  be	  apparent	  to	  the	  average	  voter.	  	  There	  are,	  however,	  three	  readily	  available	  factors	  that	  I	  can	  expect	  to	  make	  a	  difference	  in	  vote	  share.	  	  First,	  and	  consistent	  with	  decades	  of	  literature,	  is	  the	  incumbency	  advantage.	  	  Due	  to	  their	  name	  recognition,	  voting	  records,	  congressional	  privileges,	  and	  other	  benefits,	  incumbents	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  major	  electoral	  advantage,	  which	  should	  be	  particularly	  evident	  in	  primary	  elections	  without	  a	  partisan	  opponent.	  	  Secondly,	  even	  for	  non-­‐incumbents,	  we	  can	  expect	  prior	  political	  experience	  to	  give	  challengers	  an	  advantage	  over	  inexperienced	  candidates.	  	  These	  candidates	  should	  have	  some	  of	  the	  same	  name	  recognition,	  district	  connections,	  and	  fundraising	  abilities	  that	  help	  incumbents	  increase	  their	  vote	  share.	  	  Finally,	  we	  can	  expect	  that	  higher	  fundraising	  ability	  should	  help	  candidates,	  independent	  of	  other	  factors.	  	   Based	  on	  the	  data	  (Table	  12),	  incumbency	  seems	  to	  provide	  an	  enormous	  advantage	  for	  primary	  candidates	  seeking	  reelection,	  perhaps	  even	  more	  so	  than	  during	  the	  general	  election,	  with	  a	  33%	  boost	  to	  vote	  share	  because	  of	  the	  incumbency	  advantage.	  	  Given	  this	  massive	  boost,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  we	  see	  so	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Table	  12.	  Candidate	  Vote	  Share	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   	   	   	   	  prior_office	   	   7.241***	   13.04***	   2.104	  	   	   (1.751)	   (1.984)	   (1.908)	  incumbent	   	   39.31***	   	   33.37***	  	   	   (2.334)	   	   (2.460)	  fundraising	   0.138***	   	   0.106***	   0.0578***	  	   (0.0102)	   	   (0.0110)	   (0.0102)	  Constant	   31.87***	   26.49***	   27.79***	   28.91***	  	   (1.101)	   (0.858)	   (1.231)	   (1.076)	  	   	   	   	   	  Observations	   582	   776	   582	   582	  R-­‐squared	   0.240	   0.421	   0.293	   0.464	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	  	  few	  experienced	  challengers,	  particularly	  in	  primaries	  with	  more	  than	  two	  viable	  candidates.	  	  Fundraising	  also	  gives	  candidates	  significant	  electoral	  support,	  and	  on	  average	  every	  $10,000	  raised	  appears	  to	  give	  a	  candidate	  an	  additional	  .5	  percent	  of	  the	  vote.	  	  But,	  since	  changes	  in	  candidate	  vote	  share	  are	  not	  independent	  within	  a	  primary,	  this	  effect	  is	  mitigated	  when	  accounting	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  increasing	  one	  candidate’s	  vote	  share	  over	  their	  competitor’s	  vote	  share.	  	  Perhaps	  most	  intriguing	  is	  the	  finding	  that,	  controlling	  for	  both	  incumbency	  and	  fundraising,	  prior	  political	  experience	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  provide	  any	  substantial	  boost	  to	  the	  chances	  of	  winning	  a	  primary.	  	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  theorized	  benefits	  stemming	  from	  previous	  political	  experience	  are	  less	  relevant	  than	  previously	  suspected	  or,	  more	  likely,	  are	  mitigated	  by	  the	  same	  advantages	  held	  by	  congressional	  incumbents	  on	  a	  greater	  scale.	  	  However,	  as	  model	  II	  shows,	  when	  I	  do	  not	  account	  for	  candidate	  fundraising,	  experienced	  challengers	  have	  a	  seven	  point	  advantage	  over	  other,	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inexperienced	  candidates.	  	  This	  effect	  disappears	  when	  controlling	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  fundraising,	  shown	  in	  model	  4.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  suggests	  that	  while	  experience	  may	  not	  act	  as	  a	  direct	  indicator	  to	  voters,	  it	  does	  provide	  these	  candidates	  with	  a	  substantial	  fundraising	  advantage.	  
Table	  13.	  Candidate	  Fundraising	  by	  $10,000	  	   (1)	   (2)	  	   	   	  prior_office	   79.57***	   42.03***	  	   (6.750)	   (7.572)	  incumbent	   	   84.63***	  	   	   (9.382)	  Constant	   23.00***	   23.00***	  	   (4.563)	   (4.276)	  	   	   	  Observations	   582	   582	  R-­‐squared	   0.193	   0.293	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	  	  	   In	  order	  to	  test	  the	  effects	  of	  electoral	  experience	  on	  candidate	  fundraising	  ability,	  I	  run	  a	  simple	  multivariate	  regression	  using	  data	  on	  candidate	  financial	  reports	  from	  the	  Federal	  Elections	  Commission,	  analyzing	  the	  effects	  of	  experience	  on	  total	  campaign	  contributions.	  	  	  As	  the	  model	  shows	  (Table	  13),	  even	  controlling	  for	  a	  significant	  incumbency	  advantage	  in	  fundraising,	  experienced	  politicians	  can	  leverage	  their	  office,	  connections,	  and	  skills	  to	  raise	  on	  average	  over	  $400,000	  more	  than	  their	  inexperienced	  competitors.	  	  Though	  only	  about	  half	  of	  the	  fundraising	  advantage	  enjoyed	  by	  incumbent	  members	  of	  Congress,	  this	  can	  provide	  substantial	  and	  needed	  aid	  to	  an	  ambitious	  and	  skilled	  challenger,	  particularly	  in	  the	  most	  competitive	  races.	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DISCUSSION	  	   A	  candidate’s	  decision	  to	  run	  for	  public	  office	  is	  an	  essential	  step	  in	  the	  democratic	  process.	  	  While	  the	  ultimate	  candidate	  selection	  decision	  is	  made	  by	  voters	  in	  the	  general	  election,	  that	  choice	  itself	  is	  generally	  limited	  to	  the	  candidates	  nominated	  by	  the	  two	  major	  parties	  in	  their	  primaries,	  a	  choice	  which	  itself	  is	  restricted	  to	  candidates	  who	  make	  the	  choice	  to	  run.	  	  With	  an	  enormous	  incumbency	  advantage	  and	  increasing	  levels	  of	  partisan	  polarization	  diminishing	  levels	  of	  congressional	  electoral	  competition,	  the	  incentive	  to	  seek	  federal	  office	  may	  be	  lower	  than	  ever	  before.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  for	  those	  candidates	  who	  are	  conscious	  of	  the	  difficult	  road	  to	  victory,	  often	  those	  with	  prior	  political	  experience	  and	  knowledge.	  	  These	  candidates	  tend	  to	  only	  challenge	  incumbents	  when	  they	  see	  their	  chances	  of	  success	  as	  high,	  a	  prospect	  that	  is	  diminished	  further	  when	  attempting	  to	  “primary”	  an	  incumbent	  of	  their	  own	  party.	  	   This	  paper	  highlights	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  one	  of	  these	  strong	  candidates	  is	  likely	  to	  throw	  their	  hat	  into	  the	  political	  ring.	  	  As	  I	  show,	  the	  incumbent	  officeholder’s	  ideological	  extremity	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  most	  powerful	  indicator	  of	  a	  strong	  challenge.	  	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  previous	  scholarship	  studying	  the	  number,	  if	  not	  strength,	  of	  primary	  candidates.	  	  Under	  this	  framework,	  moderate	  Republicans	  and	  Democrats	  are	  significantly	  more	  likely	  than	  their	  most	  conservative	  and	  liberal	  peers	  to	  have	  closely	  contested	  races	  with	  ambitious	  politicians	  from	  within	  their	  own	  party.	  	  This	  tendency	  certainly	  plays	  a	  major	  role	  in	  increasing	  partisan	  and	  ideological	  polarization	  within	  Congress.	  	  What	  this	  paper	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does	  not	  show	  however,	  is	  the	  rationale	  for	  these	  challenges.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  considering	  the	  ideological	  biases	  of	  party	  primary	  electorates	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  general	  electorate,	  moderate	  incumbents	  are	  almost	  certainly	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  these	  challenges.	  	  More	  extreme	  wings	  of	  the	  party	  base	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  participate	  in	  primaries	  than	  moderate	  partisan	  voters,	  giving	  extremist	  challengers	  to	  moderate	  incumbents	  a	  modest	  boost	  to	  make	  up	  for	  powerful	  advantages	  held	  by	  current	  office	  holders.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  although	  this	  paper	  makes	  no	  claim	  as	  to	  the	  ideological	  preferences	  of	  copartisan	  candidates,	  moderate	  incumbents	  may	  face	  tough	  primaries	  not	  only	  because	  they	  appear	  more	  vulnerable,	  but	  also	  because	  ideologically	  extreme	  lower-­‐level	  politicians	  and	  their	  supporters	  seek	  to	  oust	  moderates	  and	  replace	  them	  with	  more	  ideologically	  “pure”	  representatives,	  a	  claim	  often	  made	  by	  the	  Tea	  Party.	  	   Of	  course,	  the	  choice	  to	  run	  for	  Congress	  is	  a	  very	  personal	  decision.	  	  Candidates	  will	  have	  to	  put	  many	  aspects	  of	  their	  life	  on	  hold	  for	  much	  of	  a	  de	  facto	  two-­‐year	  election	  period.	  	  They	  will	  be	  scrutinized	  in	  the	  public	  eye,	  have	  to	  raise	  thousands	  of	  dollars,	  and	  travel	  across	  the	  district	  away	  from	  their	  families,	  not	  to	  mention	  moving	  to	  Washington	  and	  repeating	  the	  process	  in	  the	  next	  cycle	  should	  they	  win.	  	  While	  structural	  factors	  can	  attempt	  to	  indicate	  when	  ambitious	  politicians	  may	  run	  for	  office,	  by	  nature	  this	  study	  cannot	  tell	  the	  full	  story.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  personal	  factors,	  the	  invisible	  primary	  can	  also	  structure	  candidate	  decisions,	  among	  many	  other	  unquantifiable	  considerations,	  all	  of	  which	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experienced	  politicians	  must	  take	  into	  account.	  	  To	  fully	  evaluate	  strategic	  primary	  entry,	  further	  research	  into	  these	  individual	  decision-­‐making	  structures	  is	  needed.	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